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Abstract: The Honduran PRAF experiment randomly assigned conditional cash transfers to 40 of 
70 poor municipalities, within five strata defined by a poverty proxy. Using census data, we 
show that eligible children were 8 percentage points more likely to enroll in school and 3 
percentage points less likely to work. The effects were much larger in the two poorest strata, and 
statistically insignificant in the other three (the latter finding is robust to the use of a separate 
regression-discontinuity design). Heterogeneity confirms the importance of judicious targeting to 
maximize the impact and cost-effectiveness of CCTs. There is no consistent evidence of effects 
on ineligible children or on adult labor supply. 
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1. Introduction 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have been extensively adopted in the last decade, 
especially in Latin America (Adato and Hoddinott, 2011; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). The 
programs provide cash transfers to finance current consumption, but their receipt is conditional 
on behaviors such as regular school attendance or use of primary health services. Given the 
mounting evidence suggesting that households are constrained in their knowledge of the best 
course of action, social programs that encourage them to pursue desirable actions are potentially 
welfare enhancing (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).  
Randomized experiments in Latin America consistently find that poor, school-aged children 
eligible for a CCT are more likely to enroll in school and to complete more grades (Behrman and 
Parker, 2010; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).1 The increased school attainment is accompanied by 
declines in child labor supply (Edmonds and Schady, 2012).2 This paper conducts a new analysis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The Progresa experiment in Mexico showed short-run enrollment effects of less than one 
percentage point among primary children—with primary enrollment rates already exceeding 
90%—but 6-9 percentage points among secondary school children (Schultz, 2004; Behrman et 
al., 2005; Skoufias, 2005). Almost six years after the treatment, older children exposed to the 
education transfers gained 0.7-1 more grades in school, but with no effects on achievement tests 
(Behrman et al., 2010, 2011).  The Nicaraguan RPS experiment found enrollment effects of 13 
percentage points on primary-aged children after two years of exposure to treatment, with 
accompanying gains in attendance and grade advancement (Maluccio and Flores, 2005; 
Maluccio et al., 2010).  In Ecuador, a CCT was randomly assigned to a treatment group of poor 
families, although administrative issues led nearly 42% of the control group to receive transfers 
(Schady and Araujo, 2008).  Intention-to-treat estimates show that random assignment to the 
treatment group increased enrollment by 3 percentage points, and the instrumental variables 
estimates showed effects of 10 percentage points. Finally, a CCT targeted at poor urban 
adolescents in Bogotá increased attendance and re-enrollment in secondary school (Barrera-
Osorio et al., 2011).  
2 Skoufias and Parker (2001) found that Progresa reduced work among 12-17 year-old boys by 3-
5 percentage points and 2 percentage points among girls. The Nicaraguan experiment found 
declines of 3-5 percentage points (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). In the Ecuadorean experiment, 
paid and unpaid work declined by 10 and 19 percentage points, respectively, among adolescents 
(Edmonds and Schady, 2012). Finally, the Colombian experiment found that hours worked 
declined by a third (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011). 
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of the impact of a Honduran CCT on child enrollment and work. Between 2000 and 2002, the 
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) implemented two cash transfers: (1) an education 
transfer of about US$50 per year, for each child between 6 and 12 who enrolled in and regularly 
attended grades 1 to 4; and (2) a health transfer of about US$40 per year for each child under 3 
or pregnant mother who regularly visited a health center. Of 298 Honduran municipalities, a 
randomized experiment included 70 with the lowest mean height-for-age z-scores, a proxy of 
municipal poverty (IFPRI, 2000). The 70 municipalities were divided into 5 quintiles based on 
mean height-for-age, and 8 of 14 municipalities in each quintile were randomly selected to 
receive transfers.3 
This paper uses the 2001 Honduran Census, rather than the official evaluation data.4 The 
census was conducted 8 months after the first transfer was distributed and just weeks after the 
second round of transfers. Using individual census data matched to municipal-level treatment 
data, we find that the Honduran CCT increases the enrollment of eligible children by 8 
percentage points, a 12% increase over the control group enrollment rate. We further show that it 
decreases the proportion of children who work outside the home by 3 percentage points (or 
30%), and decreases the proportion who work inside the home by 4 percentage points (or 29%).  
There is no evidence that full-sample treatment effects are biased, given balance across treatment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Some municipalities were also assigned to receive direct investments in schools and health 
centers, but these were not implemented during the time of the official evaluation (Moore, 2008). 
4 Using the official evaluation data, Glewwe and Olinto (2004) analyze child school and work 
outcomes; we discuss their findings in section 5. Morris et al. (2004) analyze health outcomes, 
finding statistically significant effects of CCTs on the frequency of antenatal care, recent health 
center check-ups and growth monitoring. Measles and tetanus immunization were not affected. 
Stecklov et al. (2007) find that CCTs produced large increases in births or pregnancy in the past 
year (measured in 2002), which they attribute this to the per-capita health transfer for pregnant 
women and young children. Alzúa et al. (forthcoming) find no effects of CCTs on adult labor 
supply. 
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and control groups in a range of observed individual and household variables not affected by the 
treatment. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the CCT literature, facilitated by the large census 
samples. First, we exploit the stratified design to estimate treatment effects separately by 
experimental strata. The estimated effects on enrollment in the two poorest (or malnourished) 
strata are 18 and 10 percentage points, respectively. The effects on child work outside the home 
are 8 and 5 percentage points and, on work inside the home, 6 and 6 percentage points, 
respectively. Depending on the stratum, these represent percentage increases of 16-32% in 
enrollment, and decreases of 50-55% in work outside the home, and 38-46% in work inside the 
home. Strikingly, the effects in three richer (but still poor) strata are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. To assess the robustness of the latter finding, we leverage the 
regression-discontinuity design implied by the formula used to select the 70 experimental 
municipalities. Though imprecise, the point estimates are consistent with the absence of effects 
in the “richest” stratum. 
Other research tends to find larger effects on enrollment when eligible children are in poorer 
households.5 However, it is important to note that our main findings of treatment heterogeneity 
are based on a feature of the original stratified design, addressing concerns about potentially 
arbitrary subgroup analysis using experimental data (Deaton, 2010). Collectively, the results 
highlight the importance of carefully choosing proxy indicators to identify and target the poor 
(Coady et al., 2004; Alatas et al., 2012; and De Wachter and Galiani, 2006). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For a review of theory and evidence, see Fiszbein and Schady (2009). For related empirical 
evidence, see Maluccio and Flores (2005), Filmer and Schady (2008), and Oosterbeek et al. 
(2008). 
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Second, the paper finds no consistent evidence that children who are ineligible for education 
transfers (by virtue of having completed fourth grade) are affected by the municipal-level 
treatment, regardless of whether an eligible child lives in the same household. A modest 
improvement in enrollment occurs in just the poorest stratum, but this could be attributed to lax 
enforcement of grade-completion requirements for eligibility. The finding contrasts with the 
relatively large positive spillovers on secondary school enrollment of children in ineligible 
households in the Progresa experiment (Bobonis and Finan, 2008).6 It is important to note, 
however, that Progresa transfers were much larger: 27 percent of pretransfer consumption vs. 7 
percent in Honduras (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). We also find no evidence that CCTs affected 
adult female labor supply. A modest impact on adult male labor supply is confined to the two 
richer strata and is not replicated by the discontinuity design. 
Third, and not least, the paper provides a rare opportunity to replicate the results of a social 
experiment using a new source of data. Using a household survey collected in late 2002, Glewwe 
and Olinto (2004) found that school enrollment in 2001 was 7 percentage points higher in 
municipalities treated with CCTs (see section 5.1). Unlike this paper’s results, they found that 
child work was only 0.5 percentage points lower in CCT municipalities, and statistically 
insignificant. However, the confidence interval is consistent with reductions even larger than 
those reported in this paper. Alzúa et al. (forthcoming) also analyzed the household survey and, 
like this paper, found no effects on adult labor supply. Our paper is the first to consider the issue 
of heterogeneity across the experimental strata, as well as spillover effects on ineligible children. 
Section 2 of the paper provides background on PRAF-II and the CCT treatment, as well as its 
randomized assignment. Section 3 describes features of the 2001 census data, while section 4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011) find that untreated siblings in a Colombian program actually have 
lower attendance and enrollment. 
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describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the empirical results, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. PRAF in Honduras 
2.1. Background 
The Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF), or Family Allowances Program, started in 
the early 1990s.7 Its first phase, PRAF-I, distributed cash subsidies to families, including a Bono 
Escolar available to children in early primary school grades, and a Bono Materno Infantil 
available to pregnant mothers and families with young children. Subsidies were supposedly 
conditioned on regular school attendance and health center visits, and PRAF-I beneficiaries were 
identified by local civil servants, including teachers and health center employees. In practice, 
PRAF-I appears to have rarely enforced conditionalities, and the poverty targeting mechanism 
was applied haphazardly with substantial leakage to higher-income families (Moore, 2008). No 
credible impact evaluations were conducted. 
In response to these shortcomings, PRAF-II was launched in the late 1990s with support 
from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It aspired to improve on PRAF-I in several 
ways, including: (1) improved enforcement of conditionalities for subsidy distribution; (2) a 
renewed emphasis on direct investments in schools and health centers alongside the distribution 
of cash subsidies; (3) an improved poverty targeting mechanism; and (4) a randomized 
evaluation design embedded within the project roll-out (IFPRI, 2000; Glewwe and Olinto, 2004; 
Morris et al., 2004). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For details on PRAF-I and its successors, see BID (2004) and Moore (2008). 
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2.2. PRAF-II Treatments 
PRAF-II implemented two kinds of cash transfers. The education transfer, in the amount of 
800 Lempiras per year (about US$50), was available to each child between 6 to 12 who enrolled 
in and regularly attended grades 1 to 4 between the school year of February to November.8  
Children were not eligible if they had already completed fourth grade. A health transfer of 644 
Lempiras per year (about US$40) was available to children under 3 and pregnant mothers who 
regularly attended health centers. Households were eligible to receive up to 3 education transfers 
and up to 2 health transfers. In practice, Glewwe and Olinto (2004) report that education 
enrollment (but not attendance) was enforced as a conditionality. Although families regularly 
deposited health center attendance slips, no health beneficiaries were suspended for failure to 
attend health centers (Morris et al., 2004). During the two years of implementation, transfers 
were distributed in November 2000, May-June 2001, October 2001, and late 2002 (see Figure 1). 
The transfers were locally distributed as cash by PRAF personnel (Moore, 2008). 
Just before PRAF-II was implemented, the median annual expenditure per capita of 
households in experimental municipalities was 3,846 Lempiras, which was well below the 
extreme poverty line of 6,462 Lempiras per year, or about US$1.20 per day (IFPRI, 2000). The 
headcount ratio was 71%. Using census data from 70 experimental municipalities, in concert 
with eligibility rules, we further estimated that the average household was eligible for 1,127 
Lempiras annually, or 182 Lempiras per capita.9 This is only about 5% of the median per capita 
expenditure, on the low side of other CCT programs in the region. By way of comparison, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Our description of the treatments relies on Morris et al. (2004).  Other sources report very 
similar but not identical amounts for the demand-side transfers (Caldés et al., 2004; Glewwe and 
Olinto, 2004; IFPRI, 2000; BID, 2004). 
9 This may understate the amount because the census does not include data on one eligibility 
criterion: whether women are currently pregnant. 
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Fiszbein and Schady (2009) calculate that CCT transfers in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico 
are 7%, 29%, and 22%, respectively, of pretransfer consumption. 
In addition to CCTs, PRAF intended to implement two kinds of direct investments in schools 
and health centers. The education interventions consisted of payments of approximately 
US$4,000 per year, depending on school size, to parent associations in primary schools (Glewwe 
and Olinto, 2004). The payments were conditioned on obtaining legal status and preparing a 
quality-improvement plan. The health interventions consisted of payments of approximately 
$6,000 per year to local health centers, depending on the client base (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004). 
The health payments were conditioned on the formation of a health team (with members of the 
community and health personnel) and the preparation of a budget and proposal. In fact, the 
distribution of education and health funds was extremely limited. By late 2002, only 7% and 
17% of the education and health funds, respectively, were disbursed, and the formation of parent 
and community groups authorized to administer funds still faced legal hurdles (Moore, 2008). 
 
2.3. Experimental Sample and Random Assignment 
To identify the experimental sample, IFPRI (2000) ordered 298 municipalities from lowest to 
highest values of the mean height-for-age z-score of first-graders, obtained from the 1997 Height 
Census of First-Graders (Secretaría de Educación, 1997). Seventy-three eligible municipalities 
had z-scores below a cutoff of -2.304. Of these, 3 were excluded because of distance and cost 
considerations, yielding a final sample of 70 municipalities, identified as the unshaded 
municipalities in Figure 2. The geographic concentration of child stunting produced a sample 
dominated by western Honduras. 
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Three treatment groups and one control group are henceforth referred to as G1, G2, G3, and 
G4.10 G1 was to receive CCTs in education and health. G2 was to receive CCTs in addition to 
direct investments in education and health centers, while G3 would receive only direct 
investments. G4 would receive no interventions. The 70 municipalities were divided into five 
quintiles of 14 municipalities, based on mean height-for-age. The random assignment occurred 
on October 13, 1999 during a public event (see Figure 1). Within each quintile, 4 municipalities 
were randomly assigned to G1, 4 to G2, 2 to G3, and 4 to G4.  The final sample consisted of 20 
municipalities in G1, 20 in G2, 10 in G3, and 20 in G4 (see Figure 2). As previously mentioned, 
there is evidence that the direct investments in G2 and G3 were not implemented during the first 
year. 
 
3. Data 
The 2001 Honduran Census was conducted between July 28, 2001 and August 4, 2001 in all 
298 municipalities (República de Honduras, 2002).  This occurred approximately 8 months into 
the first year of the PRAF-II treatment, after 2 of 3 transfer payments had occurred in G1 and G2 
(see Figure 1). This paper uses the individual and household data, merged to municipal-level data 
on treatment group and strata membership. 
Table A.1 defines three dummy dependent variables. The first variable, enrolled in school, 
indicates whether a child is enrolled in and attending school at the time of the census, more than 
halfway through 2001 school year. In this sense, it reflects initial enrollment as well as school 
drop-outs that may have occurred after enrollment but before the census. Two additional 
variables measure child labor supply in the week prior to the census. The first, work outside 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See IFPRI (2000), Glewwe and Olinto (2004), and Morris et al. (2004). 
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home, indicates whether children worked during the previous week or—conditional on a 
negative response—whether they reported non-wage employment in a family farm or business. 
The second variable, work inside the home, indicates whether children worked exclusively on 
household chores. Given the flow of the census questionnaire, this variable does not capture in-
home labor supply of children with any wage or non-wage employment outside the home. 
The independent variables defined in Table A.1 include those unlikely to be affected over the 
duration of the treatment. They include common individual variables such as age and gender, in 
addition to a dummy variable indicating self-identification as indigenous (Lenca).11 Household 
variables include parent education and literacy, household structure, dwelling quality, service 
availability, and presence of costly assets like autos and computers. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics in samples of children eligible to receive education 
transfers—that is, children between 6 and 12 who have yet to complete fourth grade. (Both work 
variables are only available for children 7 and older, leading to slightly smaller sample sizes.)  
The initial columns confirm that eligible children in the 70 experimental municipalities are more 
disadvantaged than the national sample. They are more likely to be indigenous; their parents 
have lower levels of schooling, literacy, and wealth; and they live in lower-quality dwellings. 
The remaining columns of Table 1 compare variable means within municipalities assigned to 
treatment and control groups.  For each independent variable, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that means are jointly equal across the four groups.12 In contrast, the means of dependent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Unlike Guatemala and other countries in Central and South America, this does not imply 
monolingual or bilingual status in any indigenous language. 
12 We regress each independent variable on dummy variables indicating G1, G2, and G3 (and 4 
out of 5 strata dummies), and cluster standard errors at the level of municipality. The p-value is 
from a F-test of the null that coefficients on G1, G2, and G3 are jointly zero. 
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variables suggest higher enrollment rates and reduced work in G1 and G2, relative to G3 and G4. 
We reject the null hypothesis that the means are jointly equal at the 5 percent significance level. 
  
4. Empirical Strategy 
Given randomized assignment, the empirical strategy is straightforward. The initial 
specification is: 
(1)   !!"# ! !! ! !!!!!" ! !!!!!" ! !!!!!" ! !! ! !!"#  
where O is the binary school or labor outcome of child i in municipality j in experimental block 
(or stratum) k.  The regression function conditions on three dummy variables indicating 
treatment groups G1, G2, and G3, as well block dummy variables (!!).  Henceforth, we refer to 
the quintile with the lowest mean height-for-age z-scores as block 1, up to block 5. Some 
specifications also control for a vector of child and household characteristics. We estimate the 
regressions by ordinary least squares, clustering standard errors by municipality. But recall 
evidence that the direct investments in G2 and G3 were not implemented, especially in the 2001 
school year and even by the end of the two-year evaluation (Moore, 2008).  Thus, we separately 
test null hypotheses that !! ! !, !! ! !!, and !! ! !!. We fail to reject the first two, and reject 
the third, leading us to prefer a simpler specification: 
(2)   !!"# ! !! ! !!!!"!" ! !! ! !!"#  
where !!" indicates children in the G1 or G2 experimental groups, relative to the pooled control 
group of G3 or G4. Subsequent specifications examine heterogeneity by: (1) interacting !!" 
with five experimental block dummy variables, to assess whether treatment effects vary by mean 
height-for-age; (2) interacting !!" with child-specific variables such as age, gender, and a 
poverty proxy. Finally, we estimate equation (2) in two subsamples. To test for spillovers, we 
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report estimates within the subsample of children between 6 and 12 who are ineligible because 
they have completed fourth grade. We also estimate equation (2) within subsamples of male and 
female adults, to assess whether there is an adult labor supply response to transfers. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Effects on Children Eligible for Education Transfers 
Table 2 describes the main experimental results. In panel A, column (1) shows that eligible 
students in the G1 and G2 experimental groups are, respectively, 10.1 and 7.4 percentage points 
more likely to attend school, relative to G4. The coefficient on G3 is small and statistically 
insignificant. Controlling for a full set of baseline variables in column 2 does not change the 
basic pattern of results: CCTs increase enrollments by 7-8.3 percentage points, and direct 
investments appear to have no impact.  In column (2), one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on G1 and G2 are equal (p-value=0.63), but one can reject the null that the 
coefficients on G2 and G3 are equal (p-value=0.06). Collectively, the evidence does not suggest 
that putative investments in G2 or G3 affected enrollments. Similar patterns are evident for child 
work variables in columns (4) and (6). 
Thus, the regressions in panel B include a single dummy variable, !!", indicating that the 
child resides in a G1 or G2 municipality. Conditional on individual and household variables, the 
enrollment of eligible children living in G1 or G2 increases by 8 percentage points (see column 
(2)). Columns (4) and (6) provide similar evidence for indicators of child work (the sample sizes 
are smaller because the census excluded 6 year-olds from work-related questions). Overall, 
eligible children in treated municipalities are 3 percentage points less likely to work outside the 
home and 4 percentage points less likely to work exclusively on household chores inside the 
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home. The magnitude of these estimates is substantial. In the control group, 65% of eligible 
children are enrolled in school, 10% work outside the home, and 14% work inside the home (see 
Table 3). Thus, in the full sample of eligible children, the cash transfer increases enrollment by 
12%, reduces work outside the home by 30%, and reduces work inside the home by 29%.  
The full-sample results are consistent with data from a follow-up household survey carried 
out between May and September 2002 (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004).13 In the sample of 6 to 12 
year-olds, the 2001 enrollment rate—reported retrospectively—is 7.0 percentage points higher in 
municipalities treated with CCTs (with a standard error of 2.3).14 The difference (standard error) 
for 2002 enrollments is 5.2 (2.4) percentage points, while the difference (standard error) in the 
proportion of children who worked in the week prior to the household survey is -0.5 (1.7) 
percentage points. 
The estimates from Glewwe and Olinto (2004) include all 6-12 year-olds, even a portion who 
are nominally ineligible for education transfers because they have completed four grades (see 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Glewwe and Olinto (2004) report single-difference and difference-in-difference estimates. The 
single-difference estimates—which we emphasize here—are the unadjusted difference in the 
follow-up means of treatment and control groups. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimates 
further subtract the difference in the baseline means of treatment and control groups. Their DID 
estimates for enrollment are smaller, which the authors attribute to the structure of the baseline 
data collection. Logistical constraints mandated that CCT municipalities were surveyed at 
baseline from August to October 2000, while control municipalities were surveyed from 
November to December. The school year ends and agriculture work increases in November, 
introducing a mechanical positive baseline differences in school enrollment (and a negative 
difference in child labor). The follow-up data collection in 2002 was not similarly staggered 
across treatment and control groups. 
14 Glewwe and Olinto (2004) do not report the difference in proportions between G1/G2 and 
G3/G4, or its cluster-adjusted standard error. We calculated the difference using the sample sizes 
and the proportions for each of the four groups from the follow-up survey (see their Tables 1 and 
9). Using the same data we then calculated a naïve standard error and, to account for clustering, 
multiplied it by !! !!! ! !!, the square root of the design effect; ! ! !!!"# is the intra-class 
correlation in the 70 experimental municipalities—estimated with the 2001 census—and ! ! !""!! is the average follow-up sample size within each municipality. The same method is 
applied for other dependent variables. Full results are available from the authors. 
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section 2.2). To draw a more accurate comparison with census estimates, we re-estimated the 
even-column regressions in panel B, using all 6-12 year-olds, and found slightly attenuated 
effects of 6.9 percentage points on enrollment and -2.6 percentage points on child work, with 
similar standard errors. In summary, the size and statistical significance of the full-sample 
enrollment results is quite consistent across the survey and census data. The effect on child labor 
is closer to zero (and statistically insignificant) in the survey data. However, the standard error of 
1.7 and the 95% confidence interval are consistent with declines in child work as large as 3.8 
percentage points. 
 
5.2. Heterogeneity 
Figure 3 presents visual evidence that the size of effects depends on the mean height-for-age 
z-score of municipalities (!"#), the variable used to define experimental blocks 1 to 5. We 
estimated local linear regressions (bandwidth=0.3, rectangular kernel) of each dependent variable 
on !"#. The dashed lines reports fitted values from regressions estimated in the pooled sample 
of eligible children in G1 and G2, while the solid lines refer to the sample of children in G3 and 
G4. Vertical dotted lines indicate values of !"# that define blocks 1 to 5 (while the right-most 
line, at -2.304, indicates the cutoff for inclusion in the experimental sample).15 The figure shows 
a pattern of larger treatment-control differences at lower values of !"#, particularly in the 
poorest blocks 1 and 2. 
In block 1, for example, the primary school enrollment rate in the control group is 55%, well 
below the national mean of 75% among children who meet similar eligibility criteria (see Tables 
1 and 3). Figure 3 shows that enrollments are roughly 20 percentage point higher in the treatment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The quintiles of municipalities are defined by the z-scores -2.7885, -2.6308, -2.4793, and -
2.363. 
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group—essentially at the national mean—suggesting that a modest cash transfer had a very large 
effect. A similar pattern is evident for child work outside the home in block 1. Fourteen percent 
of control-group children work outside the home, compared to a national mean of 5%, while the 
treatment group rate is similar to the national mean. 
Returning to Table 2, panel C reports regressions in which !!" is interacted with five block 
dummy variables. Focusing on even columns that include a full set of controls, the results 
confirm that enrollment effects are larger in poorer blocks (17.8 and 10.4 percentage points in 
blocks 1 and 2, respectively), and smaller and statistically insignificant in blocks 3 to 5. One can 
reject the null hypothesis (p-value=0.07) that effects are equal across blocks. A similar pattern is 
observed for child work. In blocks 1 and 2, the rate of child work outside the home falls by 7.9 
and 5 percentage points, respectively.  We reject the null hypothesis that effects are equal across 
blocks (p-value=0.06). The rate of child work inside the home falls by 6.3 and 5.8 percentage 
points (although the null of coefficient equality cannot be rejected at conventional levels of 
statistical significance).  The pattern of results is substantively similar in Panel D, where blocks 
1-2 and 3-5 are analyzed as 2 groups rather than 5. 
Overall, the results imply that a modest annual education transfer of US$50 per child had 
very large effects in the poorest Honduran municipalities, both in increasing schooling and 
reducing child labor.  In blocks 1 and 2, the point estimates imply 16-32% increases in 
enrollment relative to the control group, 50-55% decreases in work outside the home, and 38-
46% decreases in work inside the home. Significant effects are not observed in relatively less-
poor municipalities. 
Table 4 further examines heterogeneity by child and household variables. In panels A to D, 
the variable !!" is fully interacted with dummy variables indicating categories of a background 
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variable. Regressions are estimated separately in samples from blocks 1-2 and blocks 3-5. In 
panel A, the magnitude of enrollment effects in poorer blocks is largest among younger children, 
while the reductions on work outside the home are largest among older children. In panel B, 
enrollment effects are very similar by gender, but boys drive the full-sample effect on work 
outside the home. Girls drive the full-sample effects on work inside the home. Notably, there is 
still little evidence of any effects by subgroups in blocks 3-5. 
Panels C and D examine heterogeneity by two household attributes. According to program 
rules, no more than 3 education transfers are awarded to each household. We do not directly 
observe each child’s participation, but effects on an eligible child should be attenuated if that 
child has a reduced likelihood of receiving a transfer within a larger household.  Panel C 
suggests that is the case for enrollment. In blocks 1-2, for example, the effect is 12 percentage 
points for eligible children in household with 4 or more eligible children, versus 15 percentage 
points in households with 1-3 eligible children (p-value=0.02). There is no strong evidence of a 
similar difference for child labor variables. Panel D assesses whether the effects on children 
eligible for the education transfers are partly attributable to health transfers received on behalf of 
younger children in the household (recalling that families were eligible to receive a maximum of 
2 transfers for children under 3 or pregnant mothers). Overall, the magnitudes of coefficients and 
the corresponding p-values do not suggest that results among older children are driven by 
transfer income from younger children. 
Finally, panel E assesses whether the findings on heterogeneity by block may conceal effects 
among poor children who reside in “richer” blocks (or the absence of effects among better-off 
children in blocks 1 and 2). The Honduran census form does not include measures of income or 
consumption. As an alternative, we estimated the probability of extreme poverty for eligible 
! 16 
children in the census sample, using a 1999 household survey gathered just before 
randomization.16 Among eligible children, the mean probability is 0.88, with 5th and 95th 
percentiles of 0.53 and 0.99. Given assumptions described in Tarozzi and Deaton (2009), this 
implies an estimated headcount ratio of 88% among all eligible children. In the control group, it 
declines from 93% in block 1 to 84% in block 5 (see Table 3).17 While monotonically declining, 
the headcount ratios emphasize the high incidence of extreme poverty even in block 5. They also 
show that even small differences in block-level poverty are associated with large differences in 
the magnitude of treatment effects. 
The estimates in panel E interact the continuously-measured probability with CCT. In blocks 
1-2, the implied enrollment effect is 2 percentage points for a child at the 5th percentile, vs. 17 
percentage points at the 95th (recalling from Table 2 that the pooled effect in blocks 1-2 is 15 
percentage points). Child work declines by 1 and 8 percentage points for a child at the 5th and 
95th percentiles, respectively (with a pooled effect of 7 percentage points). In short, there is 
strong evidence that large effects are attenuated among the small group of children in blocks 1 
and 2 who are less likely to be poor.18 This is not true within blocks 3-5. Although correctly-
signed, the coefficients in this sample are smaller and statistically insignificant. Overall, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 We used the 1999 sample of 6-12 year-olds who have not completed fourth grade, preparing 
independent variables identical to those in Table 1, with the exception of born in municipality, 
Lenca, other, auto, refrigerator, computer, television, and Mitch which are not included in the 
household survey. We then calculated an indicator of extreme poverty using household income 
per capita and an extreme poverty line of 6,462 Lempiras per person (IFPRI, 2000). We 
estimated a logit regression of poverty on the independent variables, using the specification 
described in the note to Table 2. Finally, we used the model estimates and census data to predict 
a probability of extreme poverty for each eligible child in the census. 
17 As in most poverty mapping exercises, the most problematic assumption is area homogeneity, 
or that the conditional distribution of poverty given the independent variables in the experimental 
municipalities is the same nationwide (Tarozzi and Deaton, 2009). For that reason, we regard the 
poverty estimates as illustrative. 
18 The same pattern of results holds when using wealth proxies from Table 1 such as a dirt floor. 
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results suggests that effects are concentrated among the poorest households residing in the 
poorest municipalities. We hesitate to draw strong conclusions, however, since a violation of the 
area homogeneity assumption could lead to systematic errors in poverty predictions across 
municipalities (Tarozzi and Deaton, 2009). 
 
5.3. Effects on Ineligible Children and Adults 
Table 5 limits the sample to children ages 6-12 who are ineligible for education transfers by 
virtue of already having completed the fourth grade. Unsurprisingly, the sample contains no 6-8  
year-olds.  To assess whether spillover effects occur within families or through another 
mechanism, we identify ineligible children who reside in households: (1) with no children 
eligible for health or education transfers; (2) with at least 1 child eligible for an education 
transfer; and (3) with at least one child eligible for a health or education transfer. 
For all dependent variables, the full-sample estimates in odd columns show no evidence of 
spillover effects on ineligible children. The coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. 
There is some evidence that enrollment increases (panel A) and work outside the home declines 
(panel B) among ineligible children in block 1. The magnitude of the enrollment effect is about 
one-third the size of the effect in the sample of eligible children, and comparable or somewhat 
smaller for child labor.  The relative stability of point estimate across samples suggests that it is 
not driven by the presence other eligible children in the household.  Beyond spillover effects, a 
plausible explanation is that program administrators subjectively loosened grade-related 
eligibility requirements for age-eligible children in the very poorest municipalities. Whatever the 
explanation, it is fair to conclude that evidence on spillovers is less compelling than evidence 
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from the Progresa experiment, which offered relatively more generous transfers (Bobonis and 
Finan, 2009; Angelucci et al., 2010). 
Table 6 reports estimates within samples of male and female adults (ages 21-65), again 
dividing samples by the presence or absence of eligible children in the household.  In the full 
sample, the only marginally significant findings reveal an increase of less than one percentage 
point, among males, in the probability of working only in the home (it is apparently offset by a 
small decrease in work outside the home, although those coefficients are not significant).19 This 
result is stable across samples, even when there are no children in the household eligible for 
health or education transfers. When divided by block, it appears that the previous results for 
males are driven by slightly larger effects in blocks 4 and 5. We examine the robustness of this 
finding in the next section, since local average treatment effects in the vicinity of the HAZ cutoff 
used to select the experimental sample are informative about the magnitude of the average 
treatment effect in block 5. 
 
5.4. Robustness 
The experimental sample included municipalities with the lowest values of HAZ. Define a 
dummy variable !!"# ! !!!"#!" ! !!!!"#!, indicating individuals residing in 73 
municipalities initially eligible for random assignment (among 298 nationally). Three 
municipalities were non-randomly excluded from random assignment because of distance and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 It is possible that the local hiring of PRAF personnel affected local labor supply. Between 
1999 and 2001, the total expenditures on delivery of the CCTs—the activity most likely to 
involve locally-hired personnel—was approximately US$430,000 in the 40 treated 
municipalities, an unknown portion of which constituted the local wage bill (see Tables 2 and 3 
in Caldés et al., 2006). However, the average adult in the experimental sample had very low 
levels of formal schooling, and many employees were based in the PRAF office in Tegucigalpa. 
We cannot separately identify effects due to the CCTs or the local hiring of PRAF personnel. 
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cost concerns. The random assignment further removed 30 municipalities in the experimental 
control group. Even so, individuals residing in municipalities with a HAZ just below -2.304 
should have sharply higher probabilities of residing in a municipality with PRAF-II transfers, 
implying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
This would be straightforward to implement but for a practical complication: !"#!" is only 
observed for the 70 experimental municipalities. The 1997 height census is available in printed 
form for 298 municipalities, but the document records only three municipal variables: (1) the 
proportion of children in a municipality with z-scores less than -3, (2) the proportion with z-
scores between -3 and -2, and (3) the number of surveyed first-graders (Secretaría de Educación, 
1997). To estimate !"#!" using these data, we regress the right-censored !"#!" on the two 
observed proportions and the interaction term, weighting by the number of surveyed first-
graders.20 We then calculated a predicted value, !"#, for 298 municipalities. In the 70 
experimental municipalities, !"## !"#!!"# ! !!!". 
The discontinuity design identifies effects in the vicinity of the cutoff that bounds block 5. 
Figure 4 allows a visual assessment of whether discontinuities are evident. In each panel, the 
lines are fitted values from local linear regressions estimated in the sample of eligible children 
(the x-axis variable, !"#, is re-centered such that 0 is the cutoff). The upper-left panel suggests 
that an eligible child’s probability of residing in a treated municipality increases sharply at the 
cutoff by over 0.2. The upper-right panel shows no evidence of a sharp increase in enrollment 
near the cutoff, while the bottom-left panel suggests a small increase in work outside the home.  
Both panels illustrate a reversal of the slope on either side of the cutoff, consistent with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 We use an interval regression estimator (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 783). Unobserved values of !"#!" were mostly right-censored at -2.304. However, the three municipalities excluded for 
distance and cost considerations were known to fall within the interval of -2.3862 and -2.3678, 
given the availability of the experimental municipalities’ original rankings in the dataset. 
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experimental findings reported in Figure 3.  Finally, the lower-right panel confirms, as expected, 
that there is a positive relationship between !"# and mother’s schooling, but it is apparently 
continuous in the vicinity of the cutoff; this provides evidence of the internal validity of the 
regression-discontinuity design. Collectively, the panels suggest that the experimental results 
from the “richest” block are robust to the use of an alternate control group. 
Table 7 reports several regression specifications, including: 
 (3) !!"!"# ! !! ! !!!!"# ! !! !"#!" ! !!!"# ! !!!!!"#! !"#!" ! !!!"# ! !!"#, 
where !! represents the increase in probability of treatment at the assignment cutoff, and the 
slope of !"# is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff (the regression also includes the 
controls listed in the note to Table 2, except for block dummy variables). We also report results 
from specifications with quadratic and cubic polynomials of !"#, not interacted with !!"#. The 
sample includes all eligible children residing in municipalities with a !"# within 0.5 of the 
cutoff. 
The specifications confirm that the probability of treatment increased by about 0.3 near the 
cutoff, although only the specification in column (1) is significant at 5%. Panels B to D replace 
the dependent variable in equation (3) with each child outcome. The estimates are small and 
incorrectly-signed, although they are not precisely estimated.21 Finally, panel E confirms that 
there is no evidence of a discontinuity in mother’s schooling near the cutoff (other results, not 
reported here, confirm the same for other child and household variables in Table 1). 
We repeated the analyses for the adult labor supply outcomes, although they are not reported 
here. Among males, the negative effect on labor supply in block 5 was not replicated; in fact, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 The magnitudes are similar if a smaller bandwidth (0.3) is used. The probability of receiving 
CCTs increases by 0.25 to 0.38 in the vicinity of the cutoff, depending on the specification of the 
running variable (n=192,475). The point estimates are -0.01 to -0.003 for enrollment, and 0.016 
to 0.019 for child work. None of the coefficents are statistically significant at 10%. 
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small point estimates were of the opposite sign, small, and statistically significant at 5%. Finally, 
we estimated the regression in the subsample of eligible children whose predicted probability of 
extreme poverty (see section 5.2) is greater than the sample median of 0.85. This also produced 
no evidence of effects in block 5, with small and incorrectly-signed coefficients. 
In summary, the regression-discontinuity estimates are broadly consistent with the small size 
of the experimental estimates in block 5, although they are imprecisely estimated. The exercise 
also provides an illustration of the frequent caveat accompanying discontinuity designs: that a 
local average treatment effect at a discontinuity may not replicate the average treatment effect 
among all treated subjects. Oosterbeek et al. (2008) report a similar finding in Ecuador, with 
positive and significant enrollment effects in a poor, experimental sample, and statistically 
insignificant effects in a less-poor sample using a discontinuity design.22 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the Honduran PRAF-II experiment using 2001 census data. PRAF-II 
awarded cash transfers, conditional on school enrollment, to children ages 6-12 who had not 
completed fourth grade. Cash transfers were available in 40 randomly-chosen municipalities in 
an experimental sample of 70 poor municipalities. The 70 municipalities (of 298 total) were 
chosen because their mean height-for-age z-score of first-graders fell below a cutoff value.  In 
the full sample of children eligible for education transfers, we find that residing in a treated 
municipality increased school enrollment by 8 percentage points, decreased work outside the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 But, analyzing Progresa data, Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2004) find inconsistent results. 
Using the fact that eligibility was determined by a proxy means test within localities, they 
estimated discontinuity effects local to these cutoffs.  In an earlier round of data, these were zero 
or smaller than experimental estimates among the (poor) experimental sample. In a later round of 
follow-up data, the experimental and discontinuity effects were more comparable. 
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home by 3 percentage points, and decreased work exclusively inside the home by 4 percentage 
points. 
Caldés et al. (2006) report a total administrative program cost of US$2,881,200 between 
1999 and 2001, excluding the value of the cash transfers.23 There are 77,500 children eligible for 
education transfers in the treated municipalities, and 43,790 eligible for health transfers, 
implying that 64% of administrative costs are incurred in the distribution of education transfers. 
The cost per child—among those eligible for an education transfer—is about $24 
(2,881,200×0.64÷77,500). Following Evans and Ghosh (2008), we multiply this by 1.4 to adjust 
for the deadweight loss of taxation.  We further estimate the deadweight loss of an education 
transfer of 800 Lempiras (800÷15×0.4), following Caldés et al. (2006) by assuming an exchange 
rate of 15 per dollar. The total cost per eligible child—including deadweight loss and excluding 
the actual cash transfers—is about $55. 
Given a full-sample effect on enrollment of 8 percentage points (or 12%), the results imply a 
cost-effectiveness ratio of $4.58 for a 1% (rather than percentage point) gain in enrollment. 
These are in the lower range of similarly-calculated cost-effectiveness ratios for interventions 
aimed at increasing enrollment (Evans and Ghosh, 2008). We also find substantial heterogeneity 
by the stratifying variable of mean municipal height-for-age, with full-sample effects accounted 
for by municipalities in the 2 poorest experimental blocks.  In the combined sample of blocks 1 
and 2, enrollment increased by 15 percentage points, or 25% of the control-group enrollment 
rate, implying an even lower cost of $2.20 for 1% gain in enrollment. 
The heterogeneous results point to the importance of adequate targeting in order to maximize 
the impact and cost-effectiveness of CCTs. Finally, we find little evidence of spillovers to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The figure also excludes the costs of the impact evaluation, and the administrative costs 
involved in the delivery (or lack thereof) of the direct investments in schools and health centers. 
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ineligible children and impacts on adult labor supply. The findings of small effects in blocks 3-5 
were robust to use of a regression-discontinuity design implied by the rule used to select 
experimental municipalities.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on children eligible for the education transfer 
 
 
All Honduran 
municipalities 
Experimental municipalities 
All G1 G2 G3 G4 
p-value Mean N Mean N Mean Mean Mean Mean 
          
Dependent variables          
Enrolled in school 0.753 950,683 0.701 120,411 0.739 0.723 0.636 0.650 0.018 
Works outside home 0.047 775,673 0.076 98,783 0.075 0.054 0.092 0.099 0.026 
Works only in home 0.100 775,673 0.110 98,783 0.101 0.089 0.141 0.134 0.035 
          
Independent variables          
Age 8.381 950,683 8.498 120,411 8.449 8.505 8.550 8.528 0.189 
 (1.80)  (1.87)       
Female 0.481 950,683 0.483 120,411 0.484 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.918 
Born in municipality 0.871 950,683 0.924 120,411 0.934 0.905 0.929 0.933 0.581 
Lenca 0.053 950,683 0.319 120,411 0.391 0.266 0.336 0.286 0.317 
Other 0.029 950,683 0.035 120,411 0.005 0.049 0.063 0.041 0.295 
Father is literate 0.707 765,958 0.615 102,615 0.639 0.607 0.570 0.615 0.523 
Mother is literate 0.699 878,677 0.548 111,418 0.564 0.551 0.530 0.529 0.445 
Father's schooling 3.653 765,958 2.321 102,615 2.532 2.301 2.090 2.182 0.364 
 (3.97)  (2.72)       
Mother's schooling 3.640 878,677 2.112 111,418 2.261 2.153 1.973 1.917 0.232 
 (3.78)  (2.66)       
Dirt floor 0.434 936,249 0.719 118,697 0.726 0.724 0.728 0.698 0.893 
Piped water 0.680 936,249 0.643 118,697 0.642 0.645 0.652 0.636 0.974 
Electricity 0.475 936,249 0.144 118,697 0.146 0.156 0.096 0.151 0.848 
Rooms in dwelling 1.682 948,056 1.405 120,321 1.435 1.416 1.402 1.352 0.101 
 (0.90)  (0.72)       
Sewer/septic 0.413 948,056 0.305 120,321 0.346 0.297 0.287 0.269 0.312 
Auto 0.090 948,056 0.038 120,321 0.040 0.034 0.050 0.035 0.162 
Refrigerator 0.253 948,056 0.051 120,321 0.058 0.051 0.031 0.053 0.815 
Computer 0.018 948,056 0.002 120,321 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.177 
Television 0.373 948,056 0.076 120,321 0.090 0.072 0.047 0.078 0.781 
Mitch 0.035 948,056 0.015 120,321 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.205 
Household members 7.080 950,683 7.404 120,411 7.516 7.434 7.354 7.238 0.153 
 (3.75)  (2.41)       
Household members, 0-17 4.427 950,683 4.785 120,411 4.852 4.820 4.770 4.655 0.261 
 (3.16)  (1.92)       
          
Maximum N of children 950,683  120,411  38,435 39,065 14,154 28,757  
N of municipalities 298  70  20 20 10 20  
          
 
Source: 2001 Honduran Census and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  All samples include children ages 6-12 who have not completed fourth grade.  Standard deviations are in 
parentheses for continuous variables.  The p-value in the final column is obtained by regressing each variable on 
three treatment group dummy variables and four of five block dummy variables—clustering standard errors by 
municipality—and testing the null hypothesis that coefficients on treatment group variables are jointly zero. 
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Table 2: Effects on children eligible for the the education transfer 
 
 Dependent variable 
Enrolled in school Works outside home Works only in home 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Panel A       
G1 0.101** 0.083** -0.031 -0.024 -0.040+ -0.032+ 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
G2 0.074* 0.069** -0.045** -0.043** -0.047* -0.044** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) 
G3 -0.013 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 0.006 0.005 
 (0.052) (0.043) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026) 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.160 0.009 0.090 0.008 0.064 
p-value (G1=G2) 0.469 0.631 0.454 0.211 0.713 0.393 
p-value (G2=G3) 0.094 0.062 0.101 0.077 0.051 0.035 
       
Panel B       
CCT 0.092** 0.080** -0.035* -0.030** -0.045** -0.040** 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.160 0.009 0.090 0.008 0.064 
       
Panel C       
CCT * Block 1 0.221** 0.178** -0.095** -0.079** -0.081** -0.063* 
 (0.055) (0.045) (0.025) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) 
CCT * Block 2 0.108* 0.104* -0.058* -0.050* -0.061* -0.058** 
 (0.053) (0.042) (0.028) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) 
CCT * Block 3 0.048 0.047 -0.008 -0.011 -0.041 -0.039 
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.020) (0.016) (0.040) (0.036) 
CCT * Block 4 0.010 0.016 0.007 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) 
CCT * Block 5 0.052 0.044 -0.018 -0.009 -0.034 -0.031 
 (0.067) (0.046) (0.028) (0.021) (0.038) (0.028) 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.163 0.013 0.093 0.009 0.065 
p-value 0.049 0.074 0.038 0.060 0.402 0.545 
       
Panel D       
CCT * Blocks 1-2 0.177** 0.149** -0.080** -0.068** -0.073** -0.061** 
 (0.044) (0.034) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) 
CCT * Blocks 3-5 0.036 0.035 -0.006 -0.006 -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) 
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.163 0.013 0.092 0.009 0.065 
p-value 0.012 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.117 0.163 
       
N 120,411 120,411 98,783 98,783 98,783 98,783 
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
 
Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at 1%, * at 5%, and + at 10%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 
adjusted for municipal-level clustering. The sample includes children ages 6-12 who have not completed fourth 
grade. Each regression includes block dummy variables. Additional controls include (1) the independent variables in 
Table 1 (including age-specific dummy variables and quadratic polynomials for other continuous variables), (2) 
dummy variables indicating the number of children eligible for the education transfer in a household, (3) dummy 
variables indicating the number of children eligible for the health transfer, and (4) dummy variables indicating 
missing values of the independent variables. P-values refer to the null hypothesis that reported coefficients are equal. 
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Table 3: Means in the combined control group of G3 and G4 
 
 
Full 
sample Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 
       
Children eligible for education transfer 
Enrolled in school 0.646 0.555 0.662 0.702 0.654 0.682 
Works outside home 0.097 0.143 0.101 0.054 0.095 0.077 
Works only in home 0.136 0.168 0.125 0.113 0.137 0.129 !""# 0.887 0.925 0.900 0.893 0.869 0.841 
       
Boys eligible for education transfer 
Enrolled in school 0.636 0.548 0.665 0.687 0.641 0.667 
Works outside home 0.153 0.227 0.152 0.094 0.144 0.130 
Works only in home 0.078 0.094 0.077 0.071 0.075 0.070 
       
Girls eligible for education transfer 
Enrolled in school 0.655 0.563 0.660 0.717 0.667 0.699 
Works outside home 0.037 0.055 0.050 0.012 0.042 0.019 
Works only in home 0.198 0.245 0.173 0.157 0.204 0.194 
       
Males between 21 and 65       
Works outside home 0.930 0.955 0.932 0.908 0.932 0.921 
Works only in home 0.020 0.023 0.018 0.024 0.013 0.023 
       
Females between 21 and 65       
Works outside home 0.111 0.097 0.138 0.093 0.112 0.117 
Works only in home 0.860 0.873 0.834 0.878 0.857 0.852 
       
  
Note: Eligible children include children ages 6-12 who have not completed fourth grade. See text for definition of !""#. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneity in effects on children eligible for the education transfer 
 
 Dependent variable 
Enrolled in school Works outside home Works only in home 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A: Age       
CCT * Age 6 0.196** 0.008 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.049) (0.034)     
CCT * Age 7 0.182** 0.047 -0.059** 0.002 -0.079** -0.031 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.016) (0.011) (0.024) (0.021) 
CCT * Age 8 0.137** 0.028 -0.055** -0.006 -0.054* -0.024 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.015) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) 
CCT * Age 9 0.109** 0.021 -0.056** -0.009 -0.060** -0.022 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
CCT * Age 10 0.118** 0.026 -0.066** -0.010 -0.058** -0.017 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
CCT * Age 11 0.138** 0.087** -0.093** -0.019 -0.066** -0.040+ 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
CCT * Age 12 0.137** 0.044 -0.110** 0.000 -0.048+ -0.028 
 (0.046) (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) 
p-value 0.118 0.000 0.013 0.267 0.019 0.319 
       
Panel B: Gender       
CCT * Female 0.155** 0.030 -0.023 -0.006 -0.092** -0.035 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.028) (0.027) 
CCT * Male 0.144** 0.037 -0.111** -0.007 -0.034+ -0.018 
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.029) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012) 
p-value 0.400 0.302 0.011 0.948 0.063 0.474 
       
Panel C: Number of children in household eligible for education transfer 
CCT * 1-3 eligible 0.152** 0.038 -0.068** -0.006 -0.061** -0.027 
        (0.034) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) 
CCT * ! 4 eligible 0.123** -0.010 -0.063** -0.013 -0.070** -0.022 
        (0.040) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
p-value 0.015 0.000 0.593 0.136 0.222 0.374 
       
Panel D: Number of children in household eligible for health transfer 
CCT * ! 1 eligible 0.156** 0.037 -0.069** -0.014 -0.065** -0.029 
 (0.035) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
CCT * Zero eligible 0.140** 0.030 -0.067** 0.001 -0.058** -0.023 
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
p-value 0.233 0.525 0.785 0.030 0.373 0.496 
       
Panel E: Estimated probability of extreme poverty 
CCT -0.149** -0.026 0.061+ 0.021 0.083* 0.023 
 (0.053) (0.042) (0.034) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028) 
CCT * !""# 0.325** 0.068 -0.141** -0.031 -0.159* -0.057 
 (0.075) (0.066) (0.050) (0.037) (0.060) (0.045) 
N  43,721 74,976 35,771 61,679 35,771 61,679 
       
Sample Blocks 1-2 Blocks 3-5 Blocks 1-2 Blocks 3-5 Blocks 1-2 Blocks 3-5 
N for panels B-E 44,358 76,053 36,261 62,522 36,261 62,522 
       
 
Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at 1%, * at 5%, and + at 10%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 
adjusted for municipal-level clustering. The samples includes children ages 6-12 who have not completed fourth 
grade. All regressions include the full set of controls described in the note to Table 2; regressions in panel E also 
control for !""#. P-values refer to the null hypothesis that reported coefficients are equal.   
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Table 5: Effects on children ineligible for the education transfer 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Sample 
No eligible child in 
household 
!1 eligible for education 
transfer in household 
!1 eligible for education or 
health transfer in HH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Enrolled in school     
CCT -0.001  0.008  0.007  
 (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
CCT * Block 1  0.057  0.067**  0.067** 
  (0.039)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
CCT * Block 2  -0.005  -0.001  -0.008 
  (0.041)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
CCT * Block 3  0.005  -0.018  -0.020 
  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
CCT * Block 4  0.010  -0.008  -0.007 
  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
CCT * Block 5  -0.048+  -0.005  -0.001 
  (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
p-value  0.220  0.017  0.013 
       
Panel B: Works outside home     
CCT -0.007  -0.005  -0.004  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
CCT * Block 1  -0.050*  -0.035+  -0.034+ 
  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
CCT * Block 2  0.002  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
CCT * Block 3  0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
CCT * Block 4  -0.007  0.011  0.012 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
CCT * Block 5  0.008  0.004  0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
p-value  0.175  0.428  0.420 
       
Panel C: Works only in home     
CCT 0.005  -0.001  -0.000  
 (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
CCT * Block 1  -0.008  -0.020  -0.017 
  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
CCT * Block 2  -0.009  0.013  0.011 
  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.015) 
CCT * Block 3  -0.015  0.005  0.007 
  (0.036)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
CCT * Block 4  0.008  0.007  0.007 
  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
CCT * Block 5  0.033+  -0.004  -0.006 
  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
p-value  0.546  0.715  0.762 
       
N 4,214 4,214 16,586 16,586 17,941 17,941 
       
 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and + at 10%. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, adjusted for municipal-level clustering. The sample includes children ages 6-12 who have completed 
fourth grade. All regressions include the full set of controls described in the note to Table 2. P-values refer to the 
null hypothesis that reported coefficients are equal. 
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Table 6: Effects on adult labor supply  
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Sample 
Males Females 
No eligible child in 
household 
!1 eligible for educ. 
transfer in household 
!1 eligible for educ. or 
health transfer in HH 
No eligible child in 
household 
!1 eligible for educ. 
transfer in household 
!1 eligible for educ. or 
health transfer in HH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
           
Panel A: Works outside home           
CCT -0.013  -0.014  -0.013  0.012  0.008  0.008  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
CCT * Block 1  -0.016  -0.018  -0.017  0.046+  0.033  0.032 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
CCT * Block 2  0.026  0.010  0.007  0.012  0.028  0.026 
  (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.090)  (0.084)  (0.085) 
CCT * Block 3  0.015  0.023  0.024  -0.020  -0.017  -0.017 
  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
CCT * Block 4  -0.039**  -0.024+  -0.022+  0.000  -0.012  -0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
CCT * Block 5  -0.032  -0.050*  -0.050*  0.018  0.011  0.013 
  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.025) 
p-value  0.035  0.068  0.059  0.380  0.596  0.580 
             
Panel B: Works only in home           
CCT 0.007+  0.008+  0.008+  -0.013  -0.009  -0.009  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
CCT * Block 1  -0.004  0.002  0.002  -0.034  -0.035  -0.032 
  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.031) 
CCT * Block 2  0.000  -0.004  -0.004  -0.015  -0.021  -0.018 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.084) 
CCT * Block 3  0.004  0.006  0.007  0.028  0.014  0.012 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
CCT * Block 4  0.017**  0.016**  0.015**  -0.019  0.007  0.007 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.024) 
CCT * Block 5  0.015+  0.016*  0.016**  -0.022  -0.010  -0.013 
  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.025) 
p-value  0.098  0.063  0.024  0.293  0.743  0.756 
             
N 29,671 29,671 68,754 68,754 90,291 90,291 25,992 25,992 75,182 75,182 94,254 94,254 
 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and + at 10%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for municipal-level clustering. The 
sample includes adults between the ages of 21 and 65. All regressions include the full set of controls described in the note to Table 2. P-values refer to the null 
hypothesis that reported coefficients are equal.
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Table 7: Regression discontinuity effects on children eligible for the education transfer 
 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Panel A: CCT   
E 0.299* 0.287+ 0.299 
 (0.149) (0.151) (0.193) 
    
Panel B: Enrolled in school   
E -0.016 -0.019 -0.005 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.037) 
    
Panel C: Works outside home   
E 0.017 0.019 0.019 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
    
Panel D: Works only in home   
E 0.008 0.009 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) 
    
Panel E: Mother’s schooling   
E -0.053 -0.080 0.155 
 (0.234) (0.226) (0.337) 
    
Specification of !"# Linear (interacted 
with E) 
Quadratic Cubic 
Bandwidth 0.5 0.5 0.5 
    
 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and + at 10%. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, adjusted for municipal-level clustering.  The sample includes children ages 6-12 who have not 
completed fourth grade, residing in municipaities with !"# betweeen -0.5 and 0.5. The sample size in Panels A-B is 
341,373. The sample sizes in panels C-D is 280,762. The sample size in panel E is 316,598. In addition to the 
specified function of !"#, the regressions in panels A-D include the full set of controls described in the note to Table 
2. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of PRAF-II and data collection 
 
 
 
Source: IFPRI (2000) reports the date of randomization (October 13, 1999). Morris et al. (2004) 
report the dates of payments, including a fourth payment not shown on the timeline that “partly 
coincided with the post-intervention survey” (p. 2031). Glewwe and Olinto (2004) report dates 
of baseline and follow-up survey collection in the official evaluation; a small proportion of 
follow-up data collection occurred after September 2002. República de Honduras (2002) reports 
the census dates.  
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Figure 2: Treated and untreated municipalities 
 
 
Notes: Unshaded municipalities were randomly assigned to receive cash transfers (G1), to receive transfers and 
direct investments (G2), to receive direct investments (G3), or to receive no treatment (G4). See text for details.
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Figure 3: Experimental treatment effects by block 
 
 
Note: Solid and dahsed lines are fitted values from local linear regressions of the y-axis variable on the x-axis 
variable (bandwidth=0.3; rectangular kernel). The dashed line refers to the sample of eligible children in G1 and G2, 
and the solid line to eligible children in G3 and G4.  Dotted lines divide the 5 experimental blocks. The histogram 
applies a bin-width of 0.05 to the sample of eligible children. 
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Figure 4: Discontinuities in sample of children eligible for the education transfer 
 
 
Note: Solid lines are fitted values from local linear regressions of the y-axis variable on the x-axis variable 
(bandwidth=0.3; rectangular kernel). Dotted lines indicate the cutoff for inclusion in the experimental sample (see 
text for details). 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Table 
 
Table A.1:  Variable definitions 
 
 
Variable definition and census form question(s) used to construct variable 
  
Dependent variables  
Enrolled in school 1=Enrolled in school on census date; 0=not (F8). 
Works outside home 
1=Worked during past week, including self-employment, family business, 
and agricultural work; 0=not (F12, F13A01-04); only reported for ages 7 
and up. 
Works only in home 1=Worked during past week, exclusively on household chores; 0=not (F13B10). Variable only reported for ages 7 and up. 
  
Independent variables  
Age Integer age on census date (F3). 
Female 1=Female; 0=Male (F2). 
Born in municipality 1=Born in present municipality; 0=not (F4A). 
Lenca 1=Lenca; 0=not (F5). 
Other 1=Other non-mestizo ethnicity/race (Garífuna, etc.); 0=not (F5). 
Father is literate 1=Father is literate; 0=not (F7, F1, F2). 
Mother is literate 1=Mother is literate; 0=not (F7, F1, F2). 
Father's schooling Years of father’s schooling (F9, F1, F2). 
Mother's schooling Years of mother’s schooling (F9, F1, F2). 
Dirt floor 1=Dwelling has dirt floor; 0=not (B5). 
Piped water 1=Dwelling has piped water from public or private source; 0=not (B6). 
Electricity 1=Electric light from private or public source; 0=light from another source (ocote, etc.) (B8). 
Rooms in dwelling Number of bedrooms used by household (C1). 
Sewer/septic 1=Household has toilet connected to sewer or septic system; 0=not (C5). 
Auto 1=Household has at least one auto; 0=not (C7). 
Refrigerator 1=Household has refrigerator; 0=not (C8a). 
Computer 1=Household has computer; 0=not (C8g). 
Television 1=Household has television; 0=not (C8e). 
Mitch 1= at least 1 household member emigrated after Hurricane Mitch in October 1998; 0=not (E1). 
Household members Total individuals residing in household. 
Household members, 0-17 Total individuals, ages 0-17, residing in household. 
  
 
Notes: The Honduran census form is available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/quest/HND2001es.pdf 
 
